

Maritime Discourse, Dialogue and Deliberation in the 21st Century

by

David N. Griffiths

Presented to a conference on

Maritime Economy, Environment, and Security Co-operation: Bringing the West Pacific and the Indian Ocean Closer

National Centre for Maritime Policy Research

Bahria University

Karachi, Pakistan, 14-16 February 2015

ABSTRACT

Maritime links between the West Pacific and Indian Ocean are not only more diverse and complex today than ever before, but are also woven inextricably into an intricate web of global interrelationships. Everyone's best interests are served by peaceful cooperation but the region faces undeniable tensions and challenges ranging from non-state criminal activities to inter-state conflict. Analyzing such traditional threats is standard practice, but a less obvious, but equally crucial threat is usually overlooked – that which lurks in our own minds. The subtle but dangerous risk of inappropriate thinking and clinging to illogical fallacies and biases can be as strategically dangerous as any pirate, smuggler, terrorist or military force. Maritime professionals share a common culture which gives them a unique ability to address such issues cooperatively across national and cultural boundaries. This is an asset that could contribute much to security and prosperity among the diverse peoples of the West Pacific and Indian Oceans.

THE ENEMY WITHIN

Few would disagree that everyone's best interests are served by peaceful, economically and environmentally sustainable cooperation among the peoples of the West Pacific and Indian Ocean, in partnership with the entire global community. Equally clear, however, is that both public and private sectors face undeniable tensions, challenges, and threats. Many of these are familiar and obvious; ranging from non-state criminal activities to varying degrees of intra- and inter-state conflict. Understanding those is the everyday business of scholars and government professionals who evaluate threats, and study capabilities and intentions of actual or perceived adversaries. What often gets overlooked, however, is a dangerous and covert enemy that lurks with impunity inside our own heads.

Uncritical thinking is an insidious threat which too often influences policy decisions at all levels, regardless of nationality or ideology. Too many strategies and plans rely on assumptions and misunderstandings, or on comfortably familiar ways of thinking that have become obsolete. Emotion and ideology are the enemies of evidence-based, disciplined policy making. Woolly thinking can be as dangerous as any pirate, smuggler, terrorist or military force.

Conflict, whether physical, economic or ideological does not emerge from a vacuum: it is incubated from thoughts in someone's head. If reasons for fighting are rational, then all well and good. History suggests, however, that military conflict usually has its roots in things like miscalculation, misunderstanding, uncompromising ideology, emotion, false assumptions, and sometimes even simple accidents. Anyone responsible for national security is duty-bound to embrace critical thinking and evidence-based analysis, and to institutionalize them in strategic, operational and tactical thinking.

TO THE NUCLEAR BRINK AND BACK: A CAUTIONARY TALE

"History" Mark Twain is reputed to have said, "doesn't repeat itself, but it rhymes." Although the 21st Century presents its own unique security challenges, there are lessons from the past that can shed light on today's strategic environment.

If the years since the end of the Second World War have taught us anything it should be that despite the confident assurance of many who exercise power and influence, critical and truly

dangerous events arise more from misunderstanding or unintended consequences than from rigorously reasoned choice. The interconnectedness of our 21st Century societies, combined with the rapid decision making cycles inherent in our technology-reliant world, should elevate this concern to an overriding planning factor.

It has been more than fifty years since the Cuban Missile Crisis (as it is called by most Western countries – in former Soviet Union countries it was the Caribbean Crisis and in Cuba simply the October Crisis), yet we are only now learning the full extent of how close we all came to disaster.^[2] The lessons are sufficiently serious and relevant that they should be fully understood by our political leaders and be included as a standard case study in any strategic education curriculum.

October 1962

With the discovery in 1962 that the Soviet Union under the leadership of Nikita Khrushchev was installing nuclear-tipped missiles in Cuba, American President John F. Kennedy, with the support of the Organization of American States, declared a “quarantine” on Cuba (that word chosen to avoid the legal implications of a “blockade”). By Friday, October 26th, American authorities had become aware that at least some were operational. Meanwhile, Soviet merchant ships carrying more were approaching the perimeter of the quarantine zone, closely monitored by American naval forces with robust rules of engagement. Four Soviet submarines approaching Cuba were being tracked by the United States Navy. The U.S. had raised the alert level for its strategic strike forces to “DEFCON 2”, the highest level short of war. Cuban President Castro, convinced that an invasion was impending, had even urged Khrushchev to conduct a pre-emptive strike on the U.S. Meanwhile, both Kennedy and Khrushchev were communicating secretly to find a politically palatable way to avert catastrophe.

On the morning of October 27th, called “Black Saturday” by some because it was the peak of the crisis, an American reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over Cuba on the initiative of a local Soviet commander. On the other side of the world a similar aircraft strayed inadvertently over Soviet airspace, prompting an unsuccessful intercept by Soviet fighters. In the maritime approaches to Cuba, U.S. warships and aircraft were dropping small explosive charges near Soviet submarines in accordance with a Notice to Mariners on “Submarine Surfacing and Identification Procedures” published three days earlier.^[3] In Washington, “the majority of the president’s military and civilian advisers were prepared to recommend that if Khrushchev did not agree to remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba, the United States should attack the island.”^[4] Fortunately cool heads prevailed on both sides, and the secret communication resulted in a compromise that allowed the U.S. and Soviet Union to disengage; much to the annoyance of Castro who had been neither consulted nor informed. It had been a crisis that no one intended. Kennedy had no interest in invading Cuba: in fact, he wanted it off his agenda entirely after the aborted invasion attempt at the Bay of Pigs in 1961. Khrushchev was far more interested in the unfolding crisis over Berlin and American nuclear missiles in Turkey. Castro was convinced that socialist unity forged an unbreakable bond of common commitment between Cuba and the Soviet Union and was genuinely prepared to sacrifice Cuba to a nuclear attack for the greater cause of world socialism. Everyone recognized that catastrophe had been narrowly averted.

More than 25 years later, senior Americans, Cubans and Soviets who had participated in the crisis met in a series of conferences to seek to understand the causes and learn the lessons. Participants included Cuba’s President Castro, Robert McNamara, who had been Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense, and a number of senior Soviet decision makers, along with Khrushchev’s son. Those frank and open discussions revealed that the situation had been even more precarious than supposed at the time. The revelations were sobering.

Unbeknownst to us at the time, and quite contrary to CIA estimates, the Soviets then had approximately 160 nuclear warheads in Cuba, including scores of tactical nuclear weapons. A U.S. attack would almost certainly have led to a nuclear exchange with devastating consequences.^[5]

At the tactical level on Black Saturday, the commanding officer of one Soviet submarine had been unaware of the Notice to Mariners explaining that the explosive charges were a signal to surface. Convinced that he was under threat; with batteries and oxygen nearly exhausted; with the heat becoming intolerable in a submarine designed for northern oceans; he decided that he was within his rules of engagement to launch an attack with a nuclear-tipped torpedo. It was only the refusal of the embarked flotilla commander to concur with Captain and political officer to insert the third firing key that prevented the attack.^[6] That, the participants agreed, would certainly have triggered a nuclear exchange. No one would have willed it: it would have just happened.

Had one relatively junior personality been different, we might well be living on a post-nuclear planet today – an outcome which no responsible political authority would have intended or wanted. And although we like to believe otherwise, we remain equally vulnerable to the same risk today.

Learning from the Crisis

The Cuba missile crisis was complex, but even this brief description should suggest many lessons relevant to contemporary decision makers in the Indian Ocean, West Pacific and around the world.

1. Difficulty in looking beyond stated positions to identify actual interests.
2. Misreading of motives and intentions.
3. Additional complication and uncertainty when there are multiple players, particularly if one or more are “client” states.
4. Well educated and responsible officials thinking the unthinkable under pressure.
5. Actions by relatively junior officers at the tactical level having the potential to alter the strategic course of events in unintended and potentially disastrous directions, notwithstanding the most elaborate national plans and procedures.

Those who were at the political heart of the Cuba missile crisis have since agreed that “the decisions of all three nations, before and during the crisis, had been distorted by misinformation, misjudgement and miscalculation” and that none of the three nations had intended to reach such a risky position.^[7] McNamara summed this up with two conclusions that should resonate with any senior decision maker today:

1. “In this age of high-technology weapons, crisis management is inherently dangerous, difficult and uncertain;” and
2. “because of misinformation, misjudgement and miscalculation ... it is not possible to predict with confidence the consequences of military action between Great Powers. Therefore we must direct our attention and energies to crisis avoidance.”^[8]

Forty years afterwards, another of Kennedy’s advisers, John Stoessinger, wrote a perceptive book entitled “Why Nations Go to War”, based on eight case studies (and undoubtedly his own personal experience of the Cuba crisis). He identified eight determinants of war, the common thread among them being misperception.^[9] In managing the complex mosaic of present and evolving security relationships we would do well to heed Stoessinger’s conclusion (the emphasizing italics are his): “*the beginning of each war is a misperception or an accident.*”^[10] To quote McNamara again: “The major lesson of the Cuban missile crisis is this: the indefinite combination of human fallibility and nuclear weapons will destroy nations.”^[11]

Nuclear weapons are likely to be with us for the foreseeable future so what, then, can we do to prevent or mitigate the impact of human fallibility?

BIASES, FALLACIES AND STRATEGIC RATIONALITY

Many excellent books on logic and critical thinking identify far more common biases, fallacies and impediments to reasoned thinking than we can begin to address here. We can, however, consider a few examples that apply to the topic of this conference.

Planning Fallacy and Optimistic Bias

No plan is perfect and, if we are honest with ourselves, most of us must admit that we are often guilty of what psychologist Daniel Kahneman calls the “planning fallacy” in which we rely on overly optimistic “plans and forecasts unrealistically close to best-case scenarios.”^[12] This is one reason why so many complex projects end up being completed late and over budget. Worse, it is also one reason why people undertake risky businesses like wars: “because they are overly optimistic about the odds they face.”^[13] Even in peaceful times, complacency is unwarranted, as Eric Schlosser’s recently published study of nuclear weapon accidents reveals.^[14]

In our technically advanced world it is easy to become complacent that our carefully crafted checks and balances are fail-safe. There are two problems with that. First, nothing is perfect and the unexpected does happen. The other is that the impact of an unexpected event can have unexpectedly wide consequences in our interconnected and technology dependent world. At one point during the Cuba crisis, for example, a previously scheduled test launch of an Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile took place without the knowledge of either the U.S. President or his crisis team.^[15] Coming at a time when both sides were on high alert, an assumption by Soviet leaders that it was a preemptive strike would have been disastrous; not just for the parties involved but for the entire planet. No one would have willed it: it would have just happened.

The In-Group/Out-Group Bias

The instinct to divide ourselves into two groups – “us” and “them” – is as old as humanity itself. This has its uses and is not all bad, but does carry with it the danger of what Daniel Levitin calls the “in-group/out-group bias” in which “we tend – erroneously of course – to think of people who are members of *our* group, whatever that group may be, as individuals, while we think of members of out-groups as a less well differentiated collective.”^[16]

We often take this to ludicrous extremes routinely without even noticing it. Take nationalism as one example. Someone draws a line on a map and in no time people are characterizing those on the other side as uniformly different. Many people say that Canadians are polite. I am Canadian. Is it good logic to then assume that I must necessarily be a polite individual? I am Canadian who dislikes much about my present government. When someone criticizes “Canada’s” stand on some issue, am I obliged to defend it because of the passport I hold? If one of my fellow Canadians attributes a certain characteristic to “Americans” must I agree that all 300 million people living on the other side of the 49th parallel share it? Pope Francis, leader of the Roman Catholic Church, recently stated that “Europe is tired. We have to help rejuvenate it.”^[17] This makes a valid rhetorical point, but is it logical? What do we mean when we generalize with a term like “Europe”? Four million square miles of territory inside lines drawn on a map? More than 700 million individuals living within those boundaries? Are all of them really tired and need rejuvenating; even children, athletes and young professionals? From a political policy perspective we need to be careful about such generalizing rhetoric. From a human perspective we should recognize this irrational bias for what it is.

One challenge in thinking rationally about this bias is that there is a hard-wired neurobiological basis for it. “Within an area of the brain called the medial prefrontal cortex, there is a group of neurons that fire when we think about ourselves and people who are like us.”^[18] But while this explains, it does not excuse. Instincts such as tribalism that served us well when a few million primitive hunter-gatherers were scattered across the planet can be dysfunctional when more than seven billion individuals, half of them squeezed into urban areas, are highly interdependent, and a tiny minority has the ability to exterminate most, if not all the others. An uncritical acceptance of in-group/out-group bias as a default is no longer rational.

The serious problems of famine, war and climate change that we face will require solutions involving all the stakeholders in the future of the world. No one country can

solve these issues, and no collection of countries can if they view each other as out-groups rather than in-groups. You might say the fate of the world depends (among other things) on abolishing out-group bias. In one particular case it did.^[19]

That particular case was the Cuba missile crisis. As Kennedy and Khrushchev were agonizing over how to walk back from the brink, each with their own imperfect understanding of the other, Khrushchev's communications with Kennedy began using phrases like "try to put yourself in our place"; "I have taken part in two wars ... you are a military man" and "I hope you will understand me"; "the whole world is now apprehensive and expects sensible action of us."^[20] In essence he was, Levitin suggests, evoking commonality and attempting to cut through the in-group/out-group bias.^[21] We can no longer afford to insulate ourselves from each other because of minor or illusory differences. We are all equally human.

Decency is decent everywhere; honesty is true; courage is brave; wickedness is evil; the same ambitions, hopes and fears crowd around and result from similar experiences in every society.^[22]

It is time to accept that, in addition to our national loyalties, we are also global citizens. We must embrace our interconnectedness and interdependence. Otherwise, to paraphrase Blight and Lang, without mutual understanding we will sleepwalk toward catastrophe facilitated by ethnocentrism and lack of empathy for the position of others.^[23]

Sunk Cost Fallacy

It is not easy to discard ways of thinking upon which the expenditure of much time, effort, lives, resources and prestige have been invested. Kahneman describes this clinging to the habitual and reluctance to cut losses as the "sunk cost fallacy."^[24] In 2002, biologist Duncan Davidson coined a term for such conceptual paralysis in science – "paradigm trap".^[25] Paradigm traps occur in the world of security and strategy too, as historian Barbara Tuchman has described so eloquently in her 1984 book *The March of Folly*. Ironically, early in his presidency, Kennedy had asked the members of his National Security Council to read Tuchman's 1962 book, *The Guns of August*, chronicling the unintended drift into World War One, telling his team "I don't ever want to be in that position. We are not going to bungle into war."^[26] Months later they almost did.

ESCAPING THESE PARADIGM TRAPS

Any number of international relationships could be used as to illustrate ways of remedying common fallacies and biases in strategic thinking but, given the topic of this conference, the relationship between the Indian Ocean's two nuclear-armed states is as good an example as any. The health of that relationship will be a key element in success when "bringing the West Pacific and Indian Ocean closer." So what lessons from the Cuba missile crisis might apply here and, more particularly, what maritime policy considerations can we draw from those lessons?

From False Optimism to Rational Management

As the political veterans of the Cuban crisis learned, we can no longer afford the luxury of allowing a situation to drift into military confrontation. In the complex, interconnected world of the 21st Century, "we must recognize that the consequences of large-scale military operations – particularly in this age of highly sophisticated and destructive weapons – are inherently difficult to predict and to control."^[27] Responsible strategic priorities must therefore focus on avoiding crises if possible, and managing them when avoidance fails. The mechanisms to do so must be robust and resilient.

Ten years after the Cuba crisis, in the wake of an increasing number of potentially dangerous aggressive incidents at sea, the U.S. and Soviet Union engaged in "a remarkably unconventional and creative process of mutual problem solving. The result was an innovative agreement, signed in 1972, that proved to be not only an excellent incident-

management tool but also a catalyst for further practical cooperation.”^[28] The story of this agreement to prevent incidents at sea (INCSEA) is well told by historian David Winkler and need not be repeated here.^[29] Arguably it remains one of the better examples of a robust, resilient crisis avoidance arrangement. A significant reason for its success was the commitment by both parties to abide with the mutually cooperative spirit of the agreement rather than focusing on the narrow legal letter of the text.

In 1999, Pakistan and India recognized the value of such an agreement and undertook to “conclude an agreement on prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of navigation by naval vessels, and aircraft belonging to the two sides.”^[30] Fifteen years later the need is greater than ever. A well-crafted maritime incident prevention and management mechanism, especially if it incorporates the principles and spirit of regular, frank and open face-to-face consultations, would contribute much to the maritime security of both nations, their neighbours and the world.

From Us and Them to “Pale Blue Dot”

At the same time as the Cuba missile crisis we – humanity – were also venturing into space. The Soviet-American “Space Race” was driven by considerations of Great Power rivalry, national prestige and military advantage, but it had an unexpected side effect. Iconic pictures – from the first image of “earthrise” over the lunar horizon taken on the first manned lunar mission, to the beautiful “Blue Marble” picture taken on the final Apollo Project mission in 1972 – moved many to understand for the first time how small and fragile our little planet is.^[31] That was emphasized further in a 1990 photograph sent back to Earth from the Voyager 1 spacecraft as it was leaving the Solar System forever. At a distance of six billion kilometers from Earth, its camera recorded our planet as a tiny speck which astronomer Carl Sagan movingly described as “The Pale Blue Dot.”^[32] It is comforting that such images make us more aware of our common humanity on a fragile planet, but they should also inspire more than emotion; they should challenge us to practical questioning of old paradigms, especially our tendency to focus on differences rather than commonalities.

To examine the validity of our in-group/out-group biases we could do worse than to begin with one of Dr. Stephen Covey’s influential “7 Habits of Highly Effective People” which is, he says, “seek first to understand, then to be understood.”^[33] To understand each other we need opportunities to meet, open channels of communication and the willingness to engage in good faith. Preventing crises rather than relying on good luck requires just the opposite of secrecy and ambiguity – it means prompt correction of misconceptions and building (or restoring) mutual confidence. Secrecy and ambiguity forces the other party to make assumptions; and those can be seriously flawed when they are based on worst-case presumptions, different cultural lenses, or a belief that the other party thinks in the same way.^[34] In any case, secrecy is becoming ever more difficult to maintain in the era of social media and bodies like Wikileaks and Anonymous. Secrets will ultimately be revealed and the credibility and trustworthiness of governments judged accordingly. The state that relies heavily on maintaining secrecy and strategic ambiguity implies that it has something to hide and, worse, indicating preparedness to fight.

The alternative, of course, is mutual understanding. That does not necessarily mean absolute transparency, total agreement, or even the end to disputes. But it does mean that we need to understand each other sufficiently to be confident in each other’s intentions. That confidence must stem from dialogue. Trust and confidence does not grow from mere knowledge of facts, it also requires understanding; and that grows from constructive relationships and, above all, the ability to communicate, most especially in times of tension and disagreement. As Kennedy wrote to Khrushchev in November 1962,

If the leaders of two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger – not only for our two countries but for the whole world.^[35]

From Sunk Cost to Rising Benefit

Albert Einstein is famously reputed to have said that the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Perhaps more kindly we can say that it is one symptom of uncritical thought. If we are critical in our thinking when something is not working, then a new approach is the logical thing to try. And that may mean having the courage to admit our mistakes (at least to ourselves if not to others). A notable example is former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara who was widely reviled for his role in the Vietnam War but, on later reflection, published a memoir admitting that “we were wrong, terribly wrong. We owe it to future generations to explain why.”^[36] If only more were to show the same moral and intellectual courage. In the maritime security arena, a wisely crafted, an INCSEA arrangement can provide a means by which senior officers can be honest with their counterparts about events at sea in order to prevent future problems, as U.S. and Soviet delegates proved on many occasions.^[37] This does not diminish national prestige; it reflects rational maturity and advances national interests.

ADJUSTING COURSE

There are numerous ways to begin the gradual process of transforming relationships. Direction must come from political leadership of course, but maritime professionals can contribute to that policy direction. The following are a few possible steps, grouped into three broad categories.

Talk Together

Rational thinking would suggest that neighbours with a difficult relationship should be fostering robust military-to-military mechanisms committed to keeping channels of communication open no matter what. In adversarial relationships, communication is a core principle of successful maritime incident avoidance. Real-time communication must work well at the tactical level and strategic consultations cannot simply be put on hold when they are most needed in times of crisis. A delegate to a U.S-Soviet INCSEA consultation once noted that “if it does not work in adversity then it’s not worth the paper it’s written on.”^[38] Personal relationships and mutual professional respect can be invaluable when a crisis develops. During a naval confrontation between Canada and Spain over a fisheries dispute in 1994-1995, although the political rhetoric was fierce, “a Canadian Admiral and his Spanish counterpart were almost constantly in contact reviewing the situation and it was extremely unlikely that the two forces would ever have traded fire over the issue.”^[39] Such communication is not talking behind political backs; it is professionals following political direction to manage events so that they unfold safely and achieve political objectives.

Work Together

Working cooperatively applies not only to navies and other government maritime agencies, but also to the civilian maritime community. The navies of Pakistan and India both did superb work in response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and have both worked effectively in anti-piracy operations. The unfortunate incident between PNS Babur and INS Godavari in 2011 should not discourage closer ties but rather serve as a reminder that lack of an effective incident prevention and management arrangement can result in a public issue which may not have been willed by political authorities but just happened. Surely the rational thing to do is learn and move on.

On the civilian side, the “invisible hand” of economics will advance mutual interest and peaceful relations if it is allowed to do so. The removal of Pakistan-India trade restrictions by the 2006 revision to the 1974 Shipping Protocol is an excellent precedent.^[40] Economic solutions could also ease the plight of fishermen from both India and Pakistan arrested in the vicinity of the maritime boundary area. After all, legitimate fishermen fish where they do for economic reasons, so collaborative approaches to management would save a lot of grief, expense and impediments to good relations, while hopefully benefiting a lot of people’s lives. Chambers of commerce should be meeting; municipal officials from the great port cities of

Karachi and Mumbai should be cooperating; the possibilities are bounded only by imagination if the will is there.

Play Together

Trivial as this may sound, sport diplomacy has a long history, as cricket fans in South Asia may attest. Links between sail training vessels during Tall Ship events, simultaneous port visits, sports events between deployed units and other such social and non-political activities can not only build a spirit of confidence, but also encourage interaction among the future leaders of the respective armed forces. After all, it was “ping pong diplomacy” that enabled transformation of the relationship between China and the U.S in the 1970s. ^[41]

CONCLUSION

At their heart, most 21st Century conflicts are physical manifestations of a clash of ideas and, if so, our most dangerous enemy may lurk in our own heads. If our strategies are based on faulty assumptions, misconceptions, fallacies and biases, then we will never achieve peace and prosperity.

In a complex and interdependent world, we cannot afford “sabre rattling” and military posturing. In an era of mass destruction weapons, when governments continue to misunderstand the motives and actions of other governments, we must consider that robust conflict resolution mechanisms are a strategic necessity, not an option. The old security paradigms are vulnerable to a host of logical fallacies and biases. Today we need to seek “win-win” and avoid “zero-sum” solutions; working together to satisfy mutual interests. In the 21st Century we should never reach the point of military confrontation. Resort to, or even threat of a military “solution” is a policy failure.

Novelist Nicholas Monsarrat may have been overstating the case when he wrote that “Sailors, with their built-in sense of order, service, and discipline, should really be running the world” but there may be a kernel of truth in it. ^[42]

In the jargon of social science, those of all nationalities who go to sea can be described as an “epistemic community”—that is, a transnational group of specialists who share a common professional culture that transcends national or racial background. This is a particularly potent advantage of navy-to-navy relationships. The history of maritime confidence building is full of anecdotes about naval officers achieving levels of understanding almost unimaginable to diplomats, even to soldiers. ^[43]

If the West Pacific and Indian Ocean are to be more closely integrated into a zone of peace and prosperity, there are a lot of antagonisms, disagreements and lacks of mutual understanding and empathy that need to be addressed. That requires the courage to think clearly, acknowledge what is not working, identify counterproductive fallacies and biases and change course. Doing that requires stepping away from generalizing about others and embracing a sense of global citizenship.

Contemporary security in an increasingly interdependent world will best be achieved through mutual understanding, in sustainable cooperative security, and an acceptance of global citizenship on this “pale blue dot”. As Marshall McLuhan reminded us, “There are no passengers on Spaceship Earth. We are all crew.” ^[44]

Endnotes

1. Kornilia Chatziaslani, “Morosini in Athens”. *Archaeology of the City of Athens* (Digital Edition). http://www.eie.gr/archaeologia/En/chapter_more_8.aspx. Accessed 9 January 2015.

2. Details of the narrative are from Robert McNamara, *In Retrospect*, New York: Vintage Books, 1995, and James Blight & Janet M. Lang, *The Armageddon Letters: Kennedy / Khrushchev / Castro in the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Lanham, MD: Bowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2012.
3. David F. Winkler, *Preventing Incidents at Sea: The History of the INCSEA Concept*. Halifax, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2008, p. 61.
4. McNamara, p. 97.
5. *ibid.*
6. William Craig Reed, "Cuban Missile Crisis Secret Revealed – Four Soviet Submarines Came Within Moments of Firing Nuclear Armed Torpedoes at U.S. Fleet". *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 October 2012. Retrieved from <http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2012/10/31/cuban-missile-crisis-secret-revealed-four-soviet-submarines-came-within-moments-of-firing-nuclear-armed-torpedoes-at-u-s-fleet/>. Arkipov's story has been dramatized in a one hour 2012 PBS movie entitle "The Man Who Saved the World" at <http://video.pbs.org/video/2295274962/>
7. McNamara, pp. 328-329.
8. *ibid.*, pp. 339-340.
9. John G. Stoessinger, *Why Nations Go To War* (Eighth Edition). Bodton/New York: Bedford/St. Martins, 2001. pp. 253-258.
10. *ibid.*, p. 260.
11. Quoted in Blight & Lang, p. 7. The two have spent more than 25 years studying the crisis and interviewing its decision makers.
12. Daniel Kahneman, *Thinking, Fast and Slow*. London: Penguin Books, 2011, p. 250. Kahneman won a Nobel Prize in 2002 for his work on behavioral economics.
13. *ibid.*, p. 253.
14. Eric Schlosser. *Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Incident, and the Illusion of Safety*. New York: Penguin Books, 2014, p. 462.
15. *ibid.*, p. 462.
16. Daniel J. Levitin. *The Organized Mind: Thinking Straight in the Age of Information Overload*. Toronto: Penguin Canada Books Inc., 2014. p. 152.
17. Kerri Lenartowick, "Pope Francis: Europe is tired, must be rejuvenated." Catholic News Agency. 2014, June 15. <http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/pope-francis-europe-is-tired-must-be-rejuvenated-91085/>
18. Levitin, p. 152.
19. *ibid.*, p. 155.
20. Blight & Lang, pp. 95, 103 and 111.
21. Levitin, p. 155.
22. Chris Patten, *East and West*. Toronto: McLelland and Stewart Inc. 1998, p. 140. Patten was the last British Governor of Hong Kong.
23. Blight & Lang, p. 53.
24. Kahneman, p. 345.
25. For more on paradigm traps in international relations see David Griffiths, *U.S.-China Maritime Confidence Building: Paradigms, Precedents and Prospects*. Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, 2010. Available online at https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Publications/documents/CMS6_Griffiths.aspx
26. Described both in Blight & Lang, p. 131 and McNamara p. 96.
27. McNamara, p. 332.
28. Griffiths, *U.S.-China Maritime Confidence Building*, p. 13.
29. Winkler, 2008.
30. *Memorandum of Understanding at the time of the Lahore Declaration*. Retrieved on 16 April 2002 from <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/southasia/Lahore022299.html>
31. The 1968 "Earthrise" picture taken from Apollo 8 is available from NASA at http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/features/bm_gallery_4.html and the 1972 "Blue Marble" at <http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/view.php?id=55418>
32. Carl Sagan, *Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space*. New York: Random House, 1994, pp. 6-7. The picture is available from NASA at <http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/view.php?id=52392>.
33. Stephen R. Covey, *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Powerful Lessons in Personal Change*. Anniversary Edition. New York: Free Press, 2004. (First published in 1989.)
34. David Griffiths, "Challenges in the Development of Military-to-Military Relationships." In Erickson, A.S., Goldstein, L.J., and Li, Nan, *China, the United States and 21st-Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership*. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010. pp. 38-55.
35. Quoted in Blight and Lang, p. 185.
36. McNamara, p. xx.
37. See, for example, discussion of the Holt/Minsk incident as reported in Winkler, p. 179.
38. Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, USN, quoted in Winkler, p. 178.
39. Laura J. Higgins, *Canadian Naval Operations in the 1990s: Selected Case Studies*. Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 12. Halifax: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy

- Studies, 2002. P. 118.
40. "Pakistan, India to sign new protocol on shipping", Pakistan News Service, 14 December, 2006, <http://paktribune.com/news/Pakistan-India-to-sign-new-protocol-on-shipping-163014.html>
 41. "Pingpong Diplomacy: Celebrating 40 Years." U.S. State Department Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP), 02 December 2011. <http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2011/12/20111202165233esiul0.1428797.html#axzz3P85LSFke>
 42. Frequently quoted but source uncertain.
 43. Griffiths, *U.S.-China Maritime Confidence Building*, p.15.
 44. Marshall McLuhan in 1965, referring to Buckminster Fuller's *Operating Manual for Spaceship Earth* (1963). Quoted by Daniel A. Vallerio in *Paradigms Lost: Learning from Environmental Mistakes, Mishaps and Misdeeds* (2005), p. 367.