

CONFIDENCE BUILDING AT SEA

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Introduction

Confidence building has become an increasingly popular concept in the post-Cold War era, but experience to date suggests that conventional theory needs refining if it is to be useful to practical confidence builders in future. The Canadian Navy has particularly broad experience with its maritime aspects worldwide, albeit more by circumstance than by design. If the navy is to be an effective instrument of foreign policy in the new millennium, it would do well to foster an institutional understanding of this subject.

The Maritime Heritage

Conventional wisdom assumes that confidence building had its genesis in the mid-1970s when the term "Confidence-Building Measure" (CBM) was first introduced in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). That is simply not true. Confidence building is an activity which is not only much older, but also has considerable maritime precedent.

One of the earliest examples of a confidence-building measure

preceded one of the earliest arms control treaties. It dealt exclusively with naval issues and involved Canada. The War of 1812 had resulted in a proliferation of warships on the Great Lakes. The 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement sought to assure mutual security by limiting their number. The exchange of notes constituting the agreement was preceded, in August 1816, by a mutually announced freeze on naval construction and an exchange of lists of naval forces maintained by each side. Today, this would be described as an information exchange CBM. During the subsequent years, the letter of this agreement has long since grown obsolete, but the spirit of transparency continues to be respected. Obviously the provision limiting both sides to vessels "not exceeding one hundred tons burthen and armed with one eighteen-pound cannon"¹ has long since been exceeded, but the principle of dialogue has not. The agreement has been invoked by Canada as recently as the early 1960s, when the United States considered deploying ship- or submarine-launched ballistic missiles on the Great Lakes.²

Treaties which contain what would today be called CBMs were created in Latin America in the early and mid-twentieth century. The 1902 *Pactos de Mayo* (May Agreements) between Argentina and Chile contained information exchange elements. The *Pactos de Mayo* later served as a model for similar treaties in Europe in the 1920s.³ Similarly, the General Treaty of Peace and Amity established a system of confidence-building information exchange in Central America in 1923.⁴

Today, maritime confidence building takes many different forms, depending on the particular circumstances and cultures involved in each relationship or region. Maritime confidence building does not follow any single universal pattern, and not all approaches are universally applicable. Nonetheless, the global maritime experience offers many useful lessons.

Contemporary Maritime Confidence Building

Prevention of Incidents at Sea

Arguably the best example of a contemporary CBM, maritime or otherwise, is the concept of agreements for the prevention of incidents at sea (INCSEA). In 1972, the heads of the US and Soviet Navies signed an agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas (this wording was carefully chosen to exclude submarines). Since then, it has become one of the most enduring and resilient of all CBMs. From its bi-polar Cold War origins, the concept has been adapted and adopted worldwide (see Figure 1). During the past 25 years, the US-Soviet Union/Russia agreement has been honoured even during periods of considerable diplomatic tension. Perhaps more significantly, the mandatory annual consultations continued even during major disputes. Thus, for example, following the 1979 Soviet incursion into Afghanistan, the United States froze much normal government-to-government dialogue in protest but the annual INCSEA consultations continued. Despite occasional postponements and curtailment of the usual social activities, this channel of communication stayed open because it was a practical, non-political arrangement dealing simply with safety and the removal of ambiguity. INCSEA did not prevent incidents from happening, but the agreement provided an effective mechanism to keep them from escalating out of proportion.⁵

The successful experience of the United States and USSR led others, including Canada, to negotiate similar agreements. There have been slight changes in wording from the US model, but the main features remain identical. Ironically, as the Cold War thawed and then ended, bilateral INCSEAs with Russia continue to be negotiated. There are several reasons for this. In some cases the work was already underway. In others, political uncertainty made establishing navy-to-navy relationships even more prudent. Most significantly, however, the mandatory annual consultations called for in all such agreements provide an invaluable non-political opening to explore other avenues of cooperation. As mutual confidence

increased and incidents declined, the concept of 'staff talks' developed, adding a series of informal discussions on matters of mutual interest following the formal consultations. The INCSEA concept has also provided a model for several Dangerous Military Activities Agreements (DMAA) which address sea, land and air forces, and regions other than the high seas.

Not all INCSEAs are bilateral and not all involve Russia. There have also been moves toward regional and even global INCSEA arrangements. At the moment, however, a universal agreement is unlikely and may even be counterproductive. Much of the value of INCSEA lies in the fact that such agreements address specific problems and create politically approved, direct navy-to-navy, sailor-to-sailor linkages. There is much advantage in dealing with regional problems regionally, taking care to make the provisions of regional arrangements generally compatible with those elsewhere. Circumstances in Middle East are, for example, quite different from those in the Western Pacific or Latin America.

Figure 1. INCSEA AND SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS

INCSEAs between the USSR/Russia and:

- United States (1972)
- United Kingdom (1986)
- Canada (1989)
- Germany (1989)
- France (1989)
- Italy (1989)
- Netherlands (1990)
- Norway (1990)
- Spain (1990)
- Greece (1991)
- Japan (1993)
- Republic of Korea (1994)
- Turkey (discussions reportedly ongoing)
- Portugal (discussions reportedly ongoing)

Other INCSEA or Similar Maritime Safety Arrangements

- Germany and Poland INCSEA (1990)
- Middle East: Guidelines for Operating Procedures for Maritime Cooperation and Conduct in the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the Sea (1994) (awaiting endorsement by the Arms Control Regional Security Working Group)
- USA and China: Agreement on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime Safety (1998)
- India-Pakistan. INCSEA reportedly considered in 1991 but not pursued.
- Greece-Turkey. Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents and

Other Maritime Initiatives

- Swedish Multilateral UN proposal. Submitted to the UN in 1989 but not developed further.
- Western Pacific Naval Symposium. INCSEA draft considered but not adopted in 1996. (Track 2 discussion continuing)
- Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspace.

Dangerous Military Activities Agreements (DMAA)

- US/USSR (1990)
- Canada/USSR (1991)
- Greece/Russia (1993)

*Regional Approaches**Asia-Pacific*

There is considerable potential for maritime dispute in the Asia-Pacific region. This is particularly true in Southeast Asia which, with its archipelagic states and globally important sea lanes, has a significant maritime aspect to its regional stability and security. Maritime confidence building in the region is active and well established. It occurs both on an official "Track 1" level and at a "Track 2" level where academics and government officials, acting in their private capacities, can discuss issues informally. The primary Track 1 framework is the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) which has a total of 21 members, including Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), Russia and the United States, as well as the Asian countries. The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) brings together heads of navies, including Canada's, on a regular basis, and inter-sessional workshops are held at a working level. The idea of a regional INCSEA has been the subject of discussion in the WPNS but consensus has yet to be reached. Nonetheless, there are several bilateral arrangements in the region and discussions continue on others on a Track 2 basis.

Other Track 2 activities include a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) which includes consideration of maritime confidence building and cooperation. A Northeast Asia Cooperative Dialogue (NEACD) provides a forum for high-level discussion regarding that region, and a South China Sea Informal Meeting (SCS-IM) addresses issues related to the disputed Spratly Islands. In 1992, the ARF endorsed a concept paper which defines a regional approach to achieving security, peace and prosperity.⁶ The concept paper includes two annexes listing potential CBMs including dialogue on security perceptions, exchange of defence publications, participation in the UN Conventional Arms Register, links between military academies and staff colleges, senior officer seminars, response to environmental or natural disaster, establishing information databases, and cooperation in common problems such as

search and rescue, drug smuggling or piracy. Both lists also include peacekeeping as a CBM.

The Middle East

In 1993, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group of the Middle East Peace Process invited Canada to serve as facilitator for maritime confidence building in the region. Two activities were chosen as starting points. The first was cooperative maritime search and rescue. The other was consideration of an INCSEA arrangement.⁷ Despite the difficulties facing the Middle East Peace Process today, the foundation laid by this work has provided a basis for continuing dialogue on maritime cooperation facilitated primarily by the Canadian Coast Guard. The process and considerations which went into producing draft regional naval Guidelines for Operating Procedures have generated interest elsewhere. Although it may be coincidence, the preamble of the 1998 maritime safety agreement between the United States and China contains wording very similar to the Middle East document which acknowledges that “a spirit of good faith, mutual respect, common values and traditions are shared by professional mariners”.

Indian Ocean

Most confidence building in South Asia has been focussed on land, although maritime boundaries have been a subject of discussion between India and both Pakistan and Bangladesh. The value of an INCSEA is recognized and the idea was discussed between India and Pakistan in 1991 but, as far as can be determined, no further progress has been made.⁸ The aftershock of India's nuclear weapons tests in May 1998 highlights the need.

Latin America

The approach to maritime confidence building in Latin America has been quite different from that in either Asia or the Middle East. As described earlier, confidence building has a long history in the region, pre-dating the modern CBM concept by 70 years. There are,

of course, bilateral activities, such as Argentina-Chile and Argentina-Brazil arrangements.⁹ On a multilateral level, senior naval officers from the Organization of American States (OAS), including Canada, participate in an Inter-American Naval Cooperation (IANC) forum. A loose association of naval colleges also exists called the Naval War Colleges of the Americas. Periodic inter-American war games are played at various war colleges throughout the hemisphere. At sea, a series of naval exercises called UNITAS has been conducted annually since 1959. In the early years, before some countries were prepared to conduct exercises with others, the US Navy would send a ship or formation around South America, conducting bilateral exercises with each country in turn. This permitted each to build a basic capability for interoperability in anticipation of the time when the political climate would allow it to be practised. Canada began participating in these exercises in 1995.¹⁰ In the same year, the OAS issued the Declaration of Santiago on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, constituting an action plan which includes potential maritime initiatives, many of which are similar to those suggested for Asia-Pacific in the ARF Concept Paper.¹¹

The Caribbean

Confidence building in the Caribbean addresses non-traditional and non-military security concerns. The island states do not suffer from antagonistic relationships. Indeed, they "have already attained the type of security relations that confidence-building is intended to promote".¹² The security problems facing them now involve things like drug traffic and its associated crime problems, economic vulnerability, and natural and environmental hazards.¹³ Confidence within the region is therefore being enhanced through active cooperation. This includes a ten-member Regional Security System, OAS-coordinated work on disaster mitigation and response, coastal zone management, and climate change preparedness. In the military sphere, countries are participating in initiatives ranging from the UN Register of Conventional Weapons and the OAS inventory of confidence measures to the "Tradewinds" series of exercises.¹⁴ This

unique experience with “confidence expanding”¹⁵ provides a model which may well be useful elsewhere.

Euro-Atlantic

The Euro-Atlantic region too illustrates the value of routine cooperation as a mechanism for confidence building and dispute management. Countries which were bitter enemies 50 years ago are now joined in alliance through NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) and have achieved mutual trust through working together. That process now extends to former Warsaw Pact rivals through the Partnership for Peace program. Contemporary bilateral antagonisms and disagreements are better managed because the disputants are linked within a broader mutual security relationship. One example is that the problems between Turkey and Greece have been moderated by their mutual membership within NATO. Another is the 1995 dispute between Canada and Spain over fishing rights on the Grand Banks. Both sides deployed warships to support their national positions, public and political passions ran high and there was considerable concern on both sides of the Atlantic about escalation. Despite the tension however, the Spanish and Canadian Admirals were able to speak regularly and directly by telephone because of established personal and communication links which both enjoyed through their common security relationship. Both sides could remain confident that any escalation would be clearly politically approved, and not the result of misunderstanding or misjudgement at sea.

Even the relationship between Canada and the United States is not without disputes over fisheries and territorial boundaries. Nonetheless, it is now 90 years since Canada’s primary security threat was the United States and today’s close cooperative relationship allows such disputes to be managed peacefully.

The Maritime Advantage

Experience has shown that maritime confidence building enjoys certain advantages which can make it a valuable element of a broader confidence-building dialogue. Arguably there are six factors.

The first is the influence of the sea upon those who earn their living on it. The sea does not discriminate, and the common experiences of life at sea tend to create a common bond between professional mariners. Also, it is the nature of war at sea that the targets of attack are platforms, not individuals. The history of sea warfare is full of ferocious fights being followed by strenuous efforts to rescue survivors. Of course this "band of brothers" tradition can be over-stated and, as with everything, there are exceptions. Nonetheless, it is a solid foundation upon which to build a relationship of understanding and trust.

Second, the diplomatic role of navies has resulted in a well-established and relatively universal tradition of behaviour, custom and courtesy within which foreign warships and their crews can interact easily. This unique cultural environment provides a body of precedent and an atmosphere which is conducive to dialogue, even among antagonistic navies.

Third, there is a longstanding history and tradition of international consultation on seafaring matters. Concepts of international maritime law have roots in European and Mediterranean culture dating to the 17th century and earlier.¹⁶ The first International Code of Signals was published in 1857¹⁷ and the ancestors of today's Collision Avoidance Regulations date back to 1863.¹⁸ The requirement to share seas and waterways safely is independent of political or other rivalries. Face-to-face cooperation among mariners has well-established precedent.

The fourth factor is the nature of routine naval operations. As one author has said:

Navies of neighbouring states as well as blue water navies are far more likely to cross paths than land armies or air forces.

Navies take pride in their right of free passage, although geographical constraints in some regions can narrow significantly the freedom of movement in territorial waters. Naval exercises provide opportunities for close observation, but at close quarters, one country's exercises can be viewed with alarm by another. Crowded sea trade routes and increased competition over maritime resources can provide additional sources of tension at sea. The utility of maritime confidence-building measures (CBMs) rests, in large part, on the need to maintain maritime safety and to avoid incidents at sea. The frequency and proximity of naval interaction provides a sound basis for maritime CBMs because navies in frequent contact are more likely to establish a basic level of cooperation and understanding, even in the absence of official arrangements.¹⁹

Fifth, because most disputes tend to be focussed on issues ashore, the maritime dimensions of the disagreement are often secondary security considerations.²⁰ This means that, in some cases, the maritime dimension of an antagonistic relationship may provide a relatively non-controversial common ground as a starting point for dialogue. This factor, along with considerations of mutual safety, humanitarian or economic interests, makes maritime confidence building a very useful beginning for establishing the first links of trust between armed forces in an otherwise confrontational relationship.

Finally, maritime economic interests are rarely the concern of one country in isolation. Migrating fish, for example, do not recognize the jurisdictional lines which humans draw on charts. Resources on and under the seabed may be located beyond any single national jurisdiction, or in areas where jurisdiction is disputed. In addition, maritime issues are no longer solely the concern of coastal states. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) affirms that even land-locked states have a right of access to and from the sea, to own and operate ships and to enjoy equal treatment in maritime ports.²¹ UNCLOS also defines the

resources on the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as being “the common heritage of mankind”, in other words of all states, both coastal and land-locked.²² Some maritime aspects of confidence building may therefore be applicable to those not traditionally thought of as having maritime interests.

Confidence-Building Theory

The Nature of Confidence Building

Confidence building may be defined as an activity, undertaken honestly and in good faith, in which two or more parties seek to achieve a positive change in their security relationship.²³ To view confidence building simply in terms of negotiating a collection of individual confidence-building measures (CBMs) is to misunderstand its nature and to underestimate its potential.

Confidence building is sometimes described as “soft arms control” but, again, that undervalues its potential. It has been said that “nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other”.²⁴ In other words, attempting to assure security by maintaining large and expensive weapons inventories is not the problem—it is a *symptom* of the problem. If armament levels are genuinely maintained only for defence and not for aggression, then the underlying problem, to which arms control is a partial solution, is lack of mutual trust or confidence.

This subject of intentions suggests that another way of looking at confidence building is from the perspective of strategic analysis. In assessing any security relationship, even between the best of friends, the prudent analyst must consider two factors—capabilities and intentions. Arms control deals with the quantifiable technical issue of capabilities. Confidence building addresses the more difficult and subjective matter of intentions.

The long history of arms control, from the 1899 Hague Conference to the present, has shown that attempting to limit

armaments without also nurturing mutual confidence becomes more a matter of bargaining for advantage than a means of reducing economically burdensome and potentially destabilizing armed rivalry. Fifty years before “confidence building” became a recognized concept, President Harding of the United States said in his invitation to the 1921-22 Washington Conference on limitation of naval armaments:

It is, however, quite clear that there can be no final assurance of peace of the world in the absence of the desire for peace, and the prospect of reduced armaments is not a hopeful one unless this desire finds expression in a practical effort to remove the causes of misunderstanding and to seek ground for agreement as to principles and their application.²⁵

Harding’s “practical effort to remove the causes of misunderstanding” remains as good a working definition as any of what today would be called confidence building.

The Traditional Focus on Measures

Many analysts who write about confidence building group CBMs into categories. Such lists (or typologies) can be useful tools for understanding what has happened in the past. On the other hand, they can also cloud or constrain the vision of those who must take practical action in the present. Because CBM categories are encountered so often in the literature, the matter warrants critical examination.

In his 1985 study, James Macintosh, like many others before and since, focussed on *measures* rather than the *activity* of confidence building.²⁶ Analysing the literature of the time, he concluded that all existing CBMs could be grouped into two or three categories—*information*, *constraint*, and possibly unilateral *declaratory* measures such as “non-use of force”.²⁷ Twelve years later, he acknowledged this measure-oriented approach to be inadequate. In a 1996 critique of his earlier work, he acknowledged

that “its centre-piece definition was of CBMs, not confidence-building” and that “focussing on measures has encouraged analysts to overlook the need for process-oriented, activity-based accounts of confidence-building”.²⁸ Nonetheless, he updated and retained his typology of CBM categories because “the typology approach remains useful despite some methodological problems because it organizes a wide range of CBMs in a very accessible form according to their functional character”. Recognizing the need for flexibility, however, he added that

We may wish to add fundamentally new types of measures to this collection as our experience in this new dimension of activity grows. For the present, a “place-holder” category—“non-traditional measures”—could be added to the existing structure to underline the need to think more creatively about this possibility.²⁹

He also proposed a “transformation view” of confidence building, explaining that

[C]onfidence-building, according to the transformation view, is a distinct activity undertaken by policy makers with the minimum intention of improving some aspects of a traditional antagonistic security relationship through security policy coordination and cooperation.... This restructured relationship redefines expectations of normal behaviour among participating states.³⁰

A Non-Traditional Approach

This author’s personal experience with maritime CBMs in three different parts of the world has resulted in dissatisfaction with an assumption underlying virtually all CBM typologies. Because the requirement for confidence building arises from the existence of a non-cooperative security relationship, existing typologies tend to focus on the unsatisfactory present without acknowledging a positive

future. Even in Macintosh's revised categories, for example, the list begins with basic information exchange and ends with a restrictive body of "constraint" measures. Certainly there is nothing wrong with mutually agreed constraint and limitations. But to end the list at that point is to halt the journey before reaching the destination.

A mature and stable relationship cannot stop at "constraint". The desirable end-state is the normal, cooperative, non-hostile relationship that should exist between good neighbours. It is that ultimate positive step which is lacking in traditional theoretical typologies, and yet which is so often evident in the aspirations of those actually engaged in practical confidence building. A cooperative effort to address a mutual problem may not be defined as a CBM in traditional approaches, but it certainly contributes to the transformation of a security relationship.

Many psychologists argue that to achieve a change in human behaviour one must focus on the positive future goal rather than dwelling exclusively on the negative past. The activity of confidence building is no exception. If confidence building aims to change a human relationship, and if activities (or CBMs) must be put into categories, then a positive category addressing "normality" should be a candidate for Macintosh's "non-traditional" heading.

A better approach for the practical confidence builder, however, as Macintosh has suggested, may be to deal in verbs instead of nouns. As one simple example, some analysts have debated into what CBM category the previously described INCSEA arrangements should fall. Are they a "communication" measure, a "constraint" measure, both, or something else? Such discussions may be of academic interest, but they do nothing for the practical mariner who must negotiate or implement the arrangement.

Another trap awaiting the unwary is that thinking can be limited or distorted by the choice of words. The word "measure" for example has subtle negative nuances of confrontation and legality. One adopts a "measure" to address a problem. One does not use "measure" to describe a mutual activity with a friend or colleague. Another example is "constraint". Definitions include words like

“compulsion” or “restriction”. Surely in a genuine confidence-building process, the better choice of words would be “*restraint*”, which has the more voluntary sense of “self-control”, “moderation” or “prudence”.³¹ In addition, words may have even more nuances when they are translated into other languages. A final caution involves use of “confidence building” itself. The phrase now carries a certain amount of historical baggage, as well as different connotations in different languages.³² Confidence building is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Practical confidence builders should not become so focussed on the idea of being part of a process that they lose sight of the real aim—a security relationship based on trust instead of armament. The confidence builder must therefore take care to avoid unquestioning reliance on traditional terminology.

All that being said, there is an advantage to having a list of options available. Because each region’s needs and experience are different, it is wise to avoid becoming too seduced by any given theoretical model. Many typologies imply a progression from one type of confidence-building activity to another. A more useful approach would be to consider the options as contents of a toolbox (see Figure 2), from which one can select the appropriate tool for the job in hand.³³

Macintosh’s typology provides a good start but, as discussed earlier, the category of “cooperation” needs to be added. Its inclusion acknowledges what is happening in practice: in Asia-Pacific as Steps II and III of the ARF Concept; in Latin America with the Declaration of Santiago; in Caribbean “confidence expanding”; in the Euro-Atlantic region where it is well established; and in the Middle East, both in the context of the peace process and in normal participation in international activities.

Figure 2. A Confidence Building "Toolbox"

COOPERATION *in*:

- (1) Safety
- (2) Security
- (3) Economic prosperity
- (4) Technology
- (5) Peacekeeping

RESTRAINT *of*:

- (1) Activity
- (2) Deployment
- (3) Technology

VERIFICATION AND OBSERVATION FACILITATION *by*:

- (1) Providing opportunities to observe activities
- (2) Observation of activities of interest
- (3) Inspection
- (4) Monitoring
- (5) Facilitation of verification

INFORMATION, INTERACTION AND COMMUNICATION *through*:

- (1) Exchanging information
- (2) Observation of activities of interest
- (3) Establishing means of communication
- (4) Notification of activities

Canada and Future Confidence Building

Experience around the world has demonstrated that although progress in formal CBMs may be adversely affected by fluctuations

in the political climate, the *endeavour* of building confidence may, can and should continue, as long as the desire exists to create a positive transformation in a security relationship. The activities need not be called CBMs, indeed to do so may be to politicize them unnecessarily. Nonetheless, the activities described as confidence building are an essential element of achieving peaceful security.

Confidence building in the maritime environment is a diverse worldwide endeavour with deep historic roots. For very good reasons there are many regional variations in approach, but equally there are many commonalities and applicable lessons upon which each region can draw, and to which each region can contribute.

Canada has well-established credentials in maritime confidence building worldwide. It is a field in which the Canadian Navy can make a relatively economical but effective contribution. Canadians have a national interest in helping to create a stable, secure, peaceful and prosperous world. Maritime confidence building is a vital element of the contemporary diplomatic role of the navy and, as such, demands of its strategists and commanders a clear understanding of its principles and practice.

Notes

1. Text of the Rush-Bagot Agreement, 1817, in Gilbert Norman Tucker, *The Naval Service of Canada* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952), Appendix I.
2. Barry O'Neill, "Rush-Bagot and the Upkeep of Arms Treaties", *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 21, No. 7 (September 1991), 22.
3. Both are mentioned briefly in James Macintosh, "Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective", *Arms Control and Disarmament Studies*, No.1 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1985), 17-18. See also Commander Pedro L. de la Fuente, "Confidence-Building Measures in the Southern Cone: A Model for Regional Stability", *US Naval War College Review* (Winter 1997), 50.
4. Macintosh has identified land-oriented examples in Europe which go

back even earlier. For a comprehensive survey of examples preceding the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 see James Macintosh, "Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process", 16-25.

5. For a detailed discussion, see David F. Winkler, "US-Soviet Maritime Confidence-Building Measures", in Jill R. Junnola (ed.), *Maritime Confidence-Building in Regions of Tension* (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, May 1996).
6. Chairman's Statement at the Second ASEAN Regional Forum, Brunei Darulsalam, 1 August 1995. The text and Concept Paper have been published on the Internet at the ARF website, maintained by the Government of Australia at www.dfat.gov/arf/arf2.html.
7. Peter Jones, "Maritime Confidence-Building Measures in the Middle East", in Peter T. Haydon (ed.), *Naval Confidence-Building in the Middle East, Maritime Security Occasional Paper*, No. 2 (Halifax, Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1996).
8. Rear-Admiral K.R. Menon (Ret'd), "Maritime Confidence-Building in South Asia", in Junolla (ed.), *Maritime Confidence-Building in Regions of Tension*, 75-85.
9. Commander de la Fuente, "Confidence-Building Measures in the Southern Cone". Information on confidence building in Latin America (and elsewhere) is also available on the Henry L. Stimson Center website at www.stimson.org.
10. Robert H. Thomas, "Multinational Naval Cooperation", *Maritime Security Occasional Paper*, No. 3, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 1996, 59-60.
11. OAS Declaration of Santiago on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. Adopted at the fourth plenary session held on 10 November 1995. The text has been published on the Internet by the Canadian government at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/foreignp/disarm/santiag1.htm.
12. James Macintosh and Ivelaw Griffith, *Confidence Building: Managing Caribbean Security Concerns* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, October 1996), 1.
13. Cesar Gaviria, "Remarks by the Secretary-General of the OAS, Cesar Gaviria, at the First High Level Meeting on Special Security Concerns of the Small Caribbean Island States", San Salvador, El Salvador, 25 February 1998. Published on the OAS website at

<http://www.oas.org/EN/PINFO/SG/225carbe.htm>.

14. *Ibid.*
15. The term is introduced in Macintosh and Griffith, *Confidence Building*.
16. For example, Hugo Grotius wrote his famous treatise *De Mare Liberum (Freedom of the Seas)* in 1609.
17. "International Code of Signals" (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 1994), xviii.
18. A.N. Cockcroft and J.N.F. Lameijer, *A Guide to the Collision Avoidance Rules* (London: Stanford, 1982), 15.
19. Junnola (ed.), *Maritime Confidence-building in Regions of Tension*, ix.
20. There are exceptions of course. The jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea are one example of an almost purely maritime problem. See David N. Griffiths "Ready, ...um, Ready?", *Maritime Affairs Newsletter* (September 1996), 11-12.
21. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Part X.
22. UNCLOS, Article 136.
23. This definition is adapted from the ideas expressed by James Macintosh, "Confidence-building in the Arms Control Process: A Transformation View", *Arms Control and Disarmament Studies*, No. 2 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1996).
24. Attributed to Salvador de Madariaga. Source undetermined.
25. Quoted in Conference on the Limitation of Armament, held at Washington, November 12, 1921 to February 6, 1922: Report of the Canadian Delegate (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1922).
26. Macintosh, "Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process".
27. *Ibid.*, 10.
28. *Ibid.*, 5.
29. *Ibid.*, 52.
30. *Ibid.*, vii.
31. Sources include the British *Oxford Concise Dictionary* and *American College Dictionary*.
32. See for example, Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, "'Sailor-Made' Confidence-Building Measures", in Jozef Goldblat (ed.) *Maritime Security: The Building of Confidence* (New York: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1992).

33. The “toolbox” concept, expressed in terms of CBMs and “Conflict Avoidance Measures (CAMs)” has also been used by Michael Krepon, “The Decade for Confidence-building Measures”, in Michael Krepon (ed.), *A Handbook of Confidence-Building Measures for Regional Security* (2nd ed.; Washington DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, January 1995).

**CANADIAN GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY
THE CANADIAN NAVY AND FOREIGN
POLICY**

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Cover Photo

HMCS *Cayuga* was the third of the famous *Tribal*-class destroyers built by Halifax Shipyards during the Second World War. Four other *Tribals* were built in England, one of which, HMCS *Athabaskan*, was lost during a battle with German warships in April 1944. *Cayuga* was launched in October 1945 and commissioned into the Royal Canadian Navy on 20 October 1947. For most of her relatively short life, she paid off in February 1964, *Cayuga* was a West Coast ship. As the “flagship” of (then) Captain Jeffrey V. Brock, she led the first flotilla of Canadian warships to serve in Korea during the Korean War. She made two more deployments to Korea during the five-year period of Canadian involvement in the war and the subsequent peace monitoring. *Cayuga* joined the Atlantic fleet in 1959. Although “modernized” for anti-submarine work in 1952, *Cayuga* and the other six Canadian *Tribals* remained “gun” destroyers and frequently deployed with the RCN aircraft carrier to provide air defence as well as protection from submarine threats.

(Source: Ken Macpherson and John Burgess, *The Ships of Canada's Naval Forces 1910-1993* (St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 1994). Photo courtesy of the Maritime Command Museum, Halifax, NS.)

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