

The Influence of Seapower upon Peacekeeping: An Analytical Framework

Lieutenant-Commander D.N. Griffiths

Genesis

Contrary to popular opinion, peacekeeping is not, and was never intended to be, a solely army role. The "Pearsonian" model of peace-keeping, conceived in response to the Suez crisis of 1957, was planned from the outset as a joint, tri-service operation. Consider Prime Minister St. Laurent's statement at the time (the italics are mine):

It is proposed to offer a Canadian contingent of battalion strength, augmented by ordnance, army service corps, medical and dental detachments to ensure that the battalion group is self-contained and can operate independently from a Canadian base. The size of the contingent is expected to be over 1,000 men. Canada will be prepared to have this force lifted by the RCAF in the Middle East. It is proposed to provide this contingent with a temporary mobile Canadian base for the first phase of its policing operations. The Canadian government is prepared to use HMCS MAGNIFICENT for the purpose of transporting vehicles and stores to the Middle East and for use as a mobile Canadian base for rations, medical supplies, ammunition, fuel and limited accommodation stores. HMCS MAGNIFICENT will also provide a small hospital to accommodate the sick and injured in the force, accommodation for a force headquarters and communications between the force and Canada.¹

From the beginning, then, peacekeeping was conceived as a joint business, and was intended to exploit the inherent versatility of seapower. As things turned out, not all of these capabilities were used. It would be another 35 years, when HMCS *Preserver* served as the maritime component of the Canadian joint force in Somalia, before a

Canadian naval vessel would be employed to the extent and in the manner originally envisaged by the Canadian Suez planners.²

The characteristics of seapower give maritime forces a function in peacekeeping far beyond the support role of Suez and Somalia. The point has been well made by Peter Jones:

A warship ... is intended to be many things in many places in a relatively short period. It fulfils its deterrent and warfighting functions through flexibility, and the ability to move over great distances quickly and project power in different ways. Moreover, warships have peacetime roles which most categories of land-based equipment do not. Tanks and artillery pieces, for example, do not participate in the land-based equivalents of Search and Rescue missions or fisheries patrol.³

Maritime Factors

In considering today's strategic environment, there are four maritime factors worth noting for their potential impact on peacekeeping. First, there are 185 members of the United Nations, and of those, 150 are coastal states.⁴ In other words, eighty-one percent of the community of nations has undeniable and direct maritime interests—many of which conflict. Second, with the passing into force of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in November 1994, even land-locked states can now claim right of access to, and use of, the high seas. This includes the rights to own and operate ships, to lay pipelines and submarine cables in the Exclusive Economic Zones of coastal states, and to share in benefits from the seabed and ocean floor, described by the Convention as the "common heritage of mankind."⁵ Third, the UNCLOS process has resulted in a dramatic expansion of national claims on the world's oceans. When it began in 1973, nations were claiming sovereignty or jurisdiction over some four and a half million square nautical miles. Today, ten times that area—forty to forty-five million square nautical miles—have become waters of national interest in some fashion or another.⁶ That has inevitably resulted in increasing claims of varying validity. It is worth noting that only one of the states which had ratified the

Convention when it entered into force was a developed country.⁷ Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, sixty percent of the people in this unstable world of ours live within sixty miles of a coast.⁸

In short, there is considerable potential for increasing maritime dimensions to future conflict, and therefore to future peacekeeping.⁹

Peacekeeping is a joint business, to which the mobility, sustainability and versatility of maritime forces bring invaluable, irreplaceable and highly specialized capabilities. Maritime forces are an integral part of the nation's peacekeeping capability. Consequently strategic-level planners must recognize the potential peacekeeping capabilities of maritime forces, while operational-level planners must ensure that the doctrine for exploiting those capabilities is in place.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a framework with which to identify, define, and analyze the roles and capabilities of maritime forces in contemporary peacekeeping. For the academic, such a framework may be useful in the study of maritime peacekeeping. For the military planner, it can provide a tool with which to anticipate maritime requirements in future operations, and to identify relevant past experience.

Modern maritime strategy cannot be developed in isolation. Not only are today's military operations intrinsically joint, but the term "maritime" itself also means more than "naval." The nautical partners in the "New Peacekeeping Partnership"¹⁰ are more than just warships. On the military side they include marine corps, naval auxiliaries and air force land-based maritime aviation. There is also a substantial civil membership. The merchant marine, fisheries protection forces, coast guards, coastal police, customs services, and other such bodies all have potential roles to play. Maritime peacekeeping concepts and plans must be part of a comprehensive and holistic multi-service, multi-national, and multi-disciplinary context.

The relatively straightforward process of early peacekeeping has today given way to a whole spectrum of "peace support operations," described in various forms in virtually all modern military doctrines, but usually based on those outlined by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his 1992 *Agenda for Peace*. Preventive diplomacy, peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, peace-building and humanitarian assistance are terms which have entered into the modern military lexicon, although definitions vary considerably in detail. For purposes of this paper, "peacekeeping" will be used in its

colloquial and familiar umbrella sense, perhaps best described by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre as:

Actions designed to enhance international peace, security and stability which are authorized by competent national and international organizations, and which are undertaken cooperatively, or individually, by military, humanitarian, good governance, civilian police, and other interested agencies and groups.¹¹

There are many ways of categorizing what maritime forces can do in peacekeeping. The problem is that few which have been proposed to date are sufficiently comprehensive to provide a definitive framework for detailed study. One exception is an American study entitled "Blue Hulls,"¹² but even that addresses the issue from the unique perspective of the world's single remaining superpower.

Since the purpose of the present paper is to propose a generic working framework, directed at Canadian users but equally useful to all potential maritime peacekeepers, suffice to say that it attempts to combine as many as possible of the best features of earlier work. It is based on capabilities, grouped into roles and, in the tabular summary provided at the end, cross-referenced to *Agenda for Peace* categories. The roles have been defined specifically for analyzing peacekeeping. The capabilities are those of the entire maritime community; civil as well as naval. Examples are provided for each, some historic and some hypothetical. History alone is insufficient, since it provides useful precedents but can be misleading, because there are many well-practised capabilities which have yet to be used in a peacekeeping context.

Maritime Peacekeeping Roles

For purposes of this discussion, maritime peacekeeping capabilities are grouped into the following seven roles:

Diplomacy. Warships are extensions of the state and have intrinsic diplomatic capabilities. In the context of this discussion, these capabilities are those which directly support the work of diplomats.

Patrol. In peacekeeping, patrolling means non-forceful presence for information gathering and reporting.

Control & Protection. Capabilities in this category are naval activities which may require force to defend either oneself or others.

Enforcement. Enforcement can include capabilities to act under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, but also those which may be required, using force if necessary, to meet international legal enforcement obligations.

Rehabilitation. The term is taken from Canada's 1995 statement on foreign policy which refers to "economic and institutional rehabilitation."¹³ Although primarily applicable to peace building and humanitarian response, there are capabilities within this role which are applicable across the entire *Agenda for Peace* spectrum. It is in this role that government fleets other than navies have the greatest potential for peacekeeping contributions.

Humanitarian Response. Relief efforts to alleviate human suffering may be undertaken in response to specific crises, or as part of a broader peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission.

Mission Support. The humanitarian capabilities of maritime forces, plus certain additional military capabilities, can be equally useful in supporting peacekeepers ashore. Such mission support can be provided not only to troops, but also to civil relief and aid agencies.

These seven roles provide the framework within which the diverse capabilities of maritime forces can be categorized and examined for their relevance to peacekeeping.

Diplomacy

Deployment/Presence/Deterrence. Maritime forces can deploy at short notice, arrive quickly and remain on station indefinitely. Unlike army

units that usually arrive lightly equipped for peacekeeping, a warship arrives prepared for the full spectrum of conflict and can shift from peacetime cruising to combat readiness in minutes. Warships are legal extensions of sovereign states, so their sailing from home port, arrival on station and subsequent movements all send diplomatic signals. The symbolic value of a warship is a significant part of its crisis management potential. The presence of a warship is less intrusive than putting people on the ground. Compare the difference in signals between a warship cruising at the 12 mile limit of territorial waters, versus the significance of massing troops along a land border.¹⁴ "Gunboat diplomacy" and "showing the flag" are as old as navies, and as relevant to peacekeeping as they were to purely national self-interest.

Negotiation. Parties to conflict are often unwilling or unable to meet on each other's territory. Warships, especially on the high seas, provide an ideal neutral venue for negotiations. When peace talks were proposed between Papua New Guinea and the secessionist island of Bougainville in 1990, neither side could agree on a suitable place for negotiations. New Zealand provided the solution in a three-ship task group which assigned a frigate to each delegation, and ferried them into international waters to meet aboard the larger support ship, HMNZS *Endeavour*. While negotiations were going on, the frigates were able to conduct humanitarian deliveries, refuelled and replenished by *Endeavour*.¹⁵

Confidence Building. Mariners share a common heritage and tradition which provides an invaluable basis for maritime confidence building measures. The roots of conflict are usually on land, so it is on land that confidence can be most difficult to achieve. Even in primarily non-maritime situations, however, the less emotive maritime arena can often provide a relatively uncontroversial point of departure for confidence building. Since 1993, Canada has been providing expert facilitators from the navy, air force, Coast Guard and academia for development of maritime confidence building measures as part of the Middle East Peace Process. These include procedures to prevent incidents at sea, cooperation in search and rescue and regular meetings of senior naval officers and other maritime officials.¹⁶

Verification. Verifying compliance with arms control and other agreements is an essential part of confidence building. Credible confirmation that agreements on naval weapons are being respected requires naval expertise. Foreseeable examples include confirming declared sea mine holdings, or verifying compliance with limits to certain types of warheads on afloat weapons systems.

Patrol

Surveillance. Surveillance is a fundamental and continuous requirement in any maritime operation. Modern maritime capabilities provide reassuring presence on the maritime flank of a joint peacekeeping force. The Task Group which Canada envisages for contingency operations, including its organic helicopters, can cover an enormous area over, on and under the surface, in the order of 192,000 square kilometres (56,000 square nautical miles).¹⁷

Examination of Shipping. Examination of shipping may be required, even in situations which do not involve sanctions or embargo. Stopping the smuggling of de-stabilizing weapons to terrorists is one example. This need not be a purely naval role. The UN has used civil police ashore in the former Yugoslavia, Haiti and elsewhere. In future missions it could similarly employ coastal or harbour police afloat.

Monitoring or Observing. In addition to providing qualified individuals as UN Military Observers, or their equivalent in non-UN missions, maritime forces themselves can undertake that role afloat in any theatre of operations with scattered islands, offshore oil rigs, coasts with poor or non-existent roads, or where rivers are the highways. Recent examples have included:

Central America. In 1989, the UN established an observer group in Central America (ONUCA) which included a maritime patrol element of four disarmed patrol craft, provided and manned by Argentina, and carrying multinational observers. Patrols were conducted in the Gulf of Fonseca from June 1990 to January 1992. This force was very successful in restoring stability and substantially reducing arms smuggling by sea.¹⁸

Cambodia. A naval element of 376 personnel, drawn from six countries, including Canada, was part of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) between 1992 and 1994. Unlike earlier missions, UNTAC did not use the peacekeeper's own vessels, but reactivated a variety of Cambodian craft, painted in UN colours, in order to restore indigenous naval capability. The UN Naval Observers patrolled the coast and inland waterways; monitoring and reporting, providing transport for election officials and preventing the smuggling of arms. The naval contingent also controlled port operations.¹⁹

Control and Protection.

Interposition. Interposition in the classic land peacekeeping sense, was proposed for warships, though not implemented, for the Formosa Strait in 1954/55. Reports in early 1996 of suspected Chinese plans for naval action against Taiwan, fuelled in part by 1995 missile tests in the East China Sea and amphibious manoeuvres on islands near Taiwan,²⁰ demonstrate that planning for such contingencies may not be wasted.

Protection and Escort of Shipping. A peacekeeping variation on the familiar warfighting theme of convoying arose during the Iran-Iraq War (1984-88), when both sides began attacking neutral oil tankers. Throughout the conflict, British and American forces provided escort to neutral tankers through the Persian Gulf.

Control of Shipping. Whether or not naval escort is required, control may be necessary, either of the peacekeeper's own sealift, or of vital commercial shipping through mine or other danger areas, or in congested waters. Naval control of shipping was undertaken on a voluntary basis by British shipping during the 1984/85 Tanker War in the Persian Gulf. In anticipation of such contingencies in future, Canadian Naval Control of Shipping teams are now being organized on a deployable basis.

Security of Maritime Lines of Communication. Maintaining free and safe navigation of waterways and coastal shipping lanes is fundamental to peace and stability. Since 1982 the Italian navy has provided a

squadron of three minesweepers to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in Sinai. The mission of this Coastal Patrol Unit is to ensure freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba. Interestingly, this is not a UN operation, the vessels remain under their national flag, and work under the operational control of MFO.²¹

Harbour Control and Defence. Harbour control and defence may be required to substitute for non-existent civil authority, or to provide additional security against rogue or criminal elements in and around harbours. UN peacekeepers performed this role in Cambodia with the UNTAC Port Authority (1991-93). The United States Navy and Coast Guard had to provide a full port control and security organization in Port au Prince, Haiti, in 1994.²² The Canadian Navy maintains mobile Harbour Defence Units which could be used for this task in future missions.

Air Traffic Control and Air Defence. A suitable warship can provide air control when facilities are lacking ashore. Off Somalia in 1992, for example, a single US cruiser controlled all of the airspace within the theatre of operations.²³ Suitably-equipped warships can also contribute substantially to air defence of the maritime flank.

Evacuation of Civilian Nationals. Evacuation of civilian nationals has been a classic contingency task for multinational maritime forces, long before the invention of peacekeeping. A relatively recent example of ad hoc cooperation was the American, British and Soviet evacuation of civilians from Aden in 1986.

Enforcement

Interdiction and Embargo. "Blockade" too is a well-established naval capability, although the word itself is out of favour. Interdiction has become a common maritime role for Canadians in recent years, with operations such as the Persian Gulf in 1990, Red Sea in 1992, off Haiti in 1993-94 and in the Adriatic since 1993. One example illustrates a point made earlier—that even land-locked states may influence maritime operations. From 1965-74 the British navy mounted a substantial

economic blockade, mandated by the UN, to halt the flow of oil through Mozambique to land-locked Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).

Anti-Smuggling Operations. Smuggling may threaten a fragile peace if illegal arms are reaching those who would undermine it. Similarly, law enforcement efforts such as counter-drug operations may be required to support local authorities as peace is being re-built. Again, this is a capability which could be exercised by non-naval resources such as coast guards, customs services or coastal and harbour police.

Anti-Piracy and Anti-Slavery Operations. Suppression of piracy and slavery are obligations under international law.²⁴ Piracy is a serious problem in several parts of the world, especially in Southeast Asia, but also off some parts of West Africa and South America. Attacks have also occurred off southern India, in the Bay of Bengal and off East Africa.²⁵ The Canadian navy was forcibly reminded of the issue in 1995, when HMCS *Fredericton* responded to a distress call from a yacht under attack by pirates in the Red Sea. In areas in which peacekeeping missions may have significant maritime aspects, the possibility of piracy needs to be considered.

Economic and Institutional Rehabilitation

Fisheries Protection & Assistance. In the absence of civil order, fisheries resources on which future economic rehabilitation may depend, can be seriously depleted. In both Somalia and Cambodia, for example, the chaos ashore led to considerable exploitation by fishermen from neighbouring countries. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that future peacekeeping could be required following a maritime conflict over fisheries, such as the Anglo/Icelandic "Cod War" of 1972, or the Canadian-European Community disagreement over turbot in 1995. Civilian fisheries officers, such as those of Canada's Department of Fisheries and Oceans, have considerable operational experience in fisheries enforcement roles, and could be employed effectively under a UN civil affairs mandate.

Environmental Protection. Protecting the environment or responding to an environmental disaster may be beyond the capability of local authorities and require the assistance of the peacekeepers. War is an

inherently polluting business. Deliberate or accidental damage to facilities on the shore or ships at sea can cause irreparable damage to the local ecosystem. It has been estimated that during the war in 1991, one million barrels of oil were released into the Persian Gulf.²⁶ In such cases, timely response is of the essence, and it may be only the peacekeeping contributors who have the resources, the technical capabilities or the will to take at least "first-aid" action.

Search and Rescue. Search and rescue (SAR) is always a capability of maritime forces. Indeed, it is an obligation. Warships, maritime aircraft and government civil fleets are all equipped and practised for SAR. The requirement could arise from destruction of ships during fighting or through accidental or natural causes. It can also arise from the displacement of people. During the embargoes off Haiti and the former Yugoslavia for example, Canadian ships employed in enforcing embargoes also had to rescue Haitian and Albanian refugees, fleeing in unseaworthy craft to hopes of a better life.

Hydrographic Support and Aids to Navigation. Navigational aids may need to be restored, as they were in Haiti, before peacekeeping or humanitarian sealift can safely begin to arrive. Organizations such as the Canadian Coast Guard, as well as defence hydrographic personnel, can provide considerable expertise or operational assets, either during the initial stages of sealift, or on an ongoing basis to rebuild indigenous capability.

Mine Countermeasures. Like land mines, sea mines are a constant threat to peace operations. Forty-eight navies have mine warfare capabilities, twenty-seven countries manufacture sea mines and of those, twenty are known to be exporters.²⁷ It only takes a single ship, laying unsophisticated mines, to create operational and commercial havoc. In 1984, a Libyan merchant vessel released drifting mines during its passage through the Red Sea, effectively closing the waterway. An *ad hoc* multinational force of American, British, French, and Egyptian mine countermeasures vessels was required to clear it. In that same year, the effectiveness of mines was also being demonstrated by a mere thirty-nine mines being placed in three ports by Nicaraguan *contras* opposed to the Sandinista government. That operation produced "a damage ratio of one ship disabled for every two mines planted."²⁸

More recently, mines were laid off the Dalmatian Coast in the Adriatic during the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in 1991/92.²⁹ Sea mines are relatively cheap, widely available and effective. Like land mines, even the suspicion that they may be present can hamper peacekeeping sealift, operations and resupply, and can cripple local economies. Peacekeepers must be prepared for mine countermeasures.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal. The explosive ordnance disposal effort may require naval participation. Unexploded limpet mines on oil terminal facilities, wharves, or ship hulls can be a deadly legacy of conflict which must be removed by underwater specialists, before peacekeepers or the local economy can operate safely and effectively.

Humanitarian Response

Delivering Humanitarian Aid. To Canadians, Somalia is a familiar example of a military operation aimed at dispensing and safeguarding humanitarian aid. There have been many others. A major maritime humanitarian effort was mounted in Bangladesh after a devastating cyclone in late April 1991. Almost three million people were left homeless and in danger of starvation. An American Amphibious Task Force provided relief, assisted by British, Chinese, Japanese, French, and Indian navies, and numerous non-government organizations and aid agencies. For a period of a month, "Operation Sea Angel" distributed food, and provided potable water and medical aid.³⁰

Logistics. Naval logistics ships can serve as depots, either alongside or anchored off ports which have minimal facilities. Food, fuel and supplies can be stored securely and then distributed by land, sea or air. In Somalia, HMCS *Preserver* began its relief mission anchored off Mogadishu by day and steaming offshore by night. During the day, the ship's helicopter carried supplies to the future base of the army contingent 55 kilometres away. Simultaneously, the ship's boats were transporting people and supplies at Mogadishu. The advance party of the Canadian Airborne Regiment was met on arrival by three days of navy-delivered supplies, already on the ground.³¹

Medical & Dental Support. Ships with medical facilities can also act as clinics alongside or anchored off ports with minimal facilities. Again

using the *Preserver* example, the ship provided secure, air conditioned medical and dental facilities, complete with a full surgical team, which served not only the peacekeepers, but also journalists, non-government workers and at least one wounded Somali.³²

Technical Support. A ship designed for extensive workshop facilities and specialist technicians is the ideal platform for the kind of technical support which HMCS *Protecteur* provided in Florida and the Bahamas in 1992.³³ Nonetheless, even fighting ships like frigates can provide water purification, power generation and technical expertise in an emergency.

Mission Support to Joint Peace Operations

The logistics, medical, dental and technical support which has been described in the humanitarian support role is equally applicable to the support of peacekeepers in all types of peace operation. There are however, three additional military capabilities which warrant particular consideration.

Sealift. Naval sealift avoids potential delay while commercial contracts are being negotiated. Canada experienced this in 1995, as contracting delays and port strikes hampered arrangements for getting the Canadian contingent to Haiti. Naval sealift also gives an ability to go in harm's way if necessary, plus flexibility for other employment such as replenishment at sea of own or allied naval forces. Specialized sealift ships are preferable, such as that provided by the US Navy for the Congo in 1961, but because of the inherent flexibility of seapower, others including Canadian aircraft carriers and replenishment ships have performed splendidly in response to contingencies for which they were not designed. Canada is presently seeking to improve its ability in this regard with a multi-role support vessel ultimately replacing the more specialized existing replenishment ships.³⁴

Joint Force Headquarters. A suitably-equipped ship can provide an interim or permanent afloat headquarters, either if mobility is required, or if facilities are inadequate ashore. HMCS *Magnificent* was intended to perform this task in Suez during 1957, and HMCS *Preserver* did so in Somalia during 1992. Although *Preserver* was not designed for the

task, the ability to adapt allowed the Canadian Joint Force Commander to commence operations almost immediately (unlike his American counterpart) in relative comfort, and with adequate transport and communications facilities.³⁵ This capability is now actively exercised by the Canadian Forces, and is part of Canadian contingency planning.

Redeployment or Withdrawal. When troops are put on the ground in peacekeeping, a plan to get them out must also be in place. Maritime forces may well be the means to withdraw troops, as USS *Cambria* did from Gaza in 1956,³⁶ HMCS *Terra Nova* and *Kootenay* were prepared to do off Vietnam in 1973,³⁷ and NATO, WEU and other IFOR contributors are prepared to do today in the Adriatic. A naval task force offshore is a reassuring presence to troops if withdrawal becomes a possibility.

Conclusion

As the foregoing survey shows, the maritime dimension of peacekeeping is diverse and extensive. For convenience, the roles and capabilities which have been discussed are summarized in the Table which follows. The applicability of each capability to *Agenda for Peace* categories is also suggested, as a starting point for further analysis and discussion.

Peacekeeping can no longer be regarded as the exclusive preserve of soldiers; it is a joint business with maritime aspects, to which naval and civil maritime forces will increasingly have to bring their specialized and diverse capabilities. Consequently, the maritime dimension of peacekeeping warrants comprehensive study, professional development and contingency planning. It is not good enough to wait until the day those capabilities are needed to begin deciding how to use them.

Lieutenant-Commander Griffiths is Senior Staff Officer Doctrine at Maritime Command HQ, and is a member of the Adjunct Faculty at the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre.

Endnotes

1. Quoted in Alex Morrison & Stephanie Blair, *Canada and Peacekeeping: Dedication and Service*, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995, p.1.
2. An excellent description has been written by the Commanding Officer at the time. See Capt(N) R.W.Allen, "Combined and Joint Operations in Somalia," *CF Maritime Warfare Centre Bulletin 2/94*, pp. 79-104.
3. Peter Jones "The Future of Naval Arms Control (Including Confidence Building Measures)," in *Maritime Forces in Global Security*, Ann L. Griffiths & Peter T. Haydon, eds (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1994) p.100.
4. Elisabeth Mann Borgese, *Ocean Governance and the United Nations* (Halifax, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1995) p.5.
5. United Nations, *UN Convention on the Law of the Sea*, (New York 1983).
6. Rear-Admiral G.L. Garnett, Keynote Address to the Maritime Peacekeeping Course at the Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre, 1 September 1995.
7. Borgese, *op. cit.*, p.5.
8. Borgese, *op. cit.*, p.3.
9. For further discussion, see Prof. Aldo Chircop, "Competing Demands for Ocean Use," in *Maritime Security and Conflict Resolution at Sea in the Post-Cold War Era*, Peter T. Haydon and Ann L. Griffiths, eds. (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1993).
10. The term is used by the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, see Morrison & Blair, *op. cit.*, p.10.
11. Morrison & Blair, *op. cit.*, p.11.
12. Jeffrey I. Sands, *Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the United Nations*, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993).
13. *Canada in the World: Government Statement*. (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1995).
14. Pointed out by Prof. Michael Pugh in his lecture to the Maritime Peacekeeping Course at the Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre on 22 August 1995.
15. Sean Dorney, "Talk of Peace," *Islands Business*, September 1990
16. Jones, *op. cit.*, pp 106-119.
17. Fred W. Crickard & Peter T. Haydon, *Why Canada Needs Maritime Forces* (Ottawa: Naval Officers' Association of Canada, 1994).
18. Commander Juan Carlos Neves, "The Argentine Navy and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Gulf of Fonseca," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1994, pp 40-66.
19. LCdr Ted Dochau, "Cambodia—The Forgotten Mission. Part 1: Apocalypse II," *Maritime Engineering Journal*, February 1995, pp. 6-10.
20. "Chinese Attack on Taiwan Feared", the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, January 25, 1996, p.A9.
21. *The Multinational Force and Observers: Servants of Peace*, MFO Rome, 1993.
22. "MARDEZLANT Deploys HDC [Harbor Defence Command] to Haiti for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY", in *Naval Coastal Warfare News*, Volume 1 Issue 2, Winter 1995.

30 *The Influence of Seapower upon Peacekeeping*

23. Allen, *op. cit.*
24. UNCLOS, *op. cit.*, Articles 99 and 100
25. Major-General Edward Fursdon, "Of Piracy and Robbers," *Navy International*, Vol.99, No. 5/6 1994, pp. 146-148.
26. Arthur Westing "Environmental Dimensions of Maritime Security" in *Maritime Security: The Building of Confidence*, Jozef Goldblat ed. (New York: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1992).
27. *U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Plan* (2nd edition), (Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, February 1994), p. 21.
28. Captain James M. Martin and Bertrand P. Ramsay, "Sea Mines in Nicaragua," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, September 1990
29. Milan Vego, "War on the Yugoslav Coast," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, March 1992.
30. Lecture by Capt(N) Robert Thomas (ret'd) at the Maritime Dimension of Peacekeeping Course at the Pearson Peacekeeping Training Centre on 21 August 1995.
31. Allen, *op. cit.*
32. *ibid.*
33. Lt(N) F.T. Tait & Lt(N) W.R. Mack, "Operation of the Hurricane Maintenance and Clean Up Ship: HMCS PROTECTEUR (AOR 509)," *Maritime Warfare Bulletin* 2/94, CF Maritime Warfare Centre, Halifax, 1994.
34. Vice-Admiral P.W. Cairns, *The Naval Vision* (Halifax: Maritime Command Headquarters, 1994) p. 23.
35. Allen, *op. cit.*
36. Sands, *op. cit.*
37. Helena M. Cerigo, "The Canadian Navy and International Conflict Resolution," *Maritime Warfare Bulletin*, 94/1, CF Maritime Warfare Centre, Halifax, 1994.

Maritime Peacekeeping Roles and Capabilities

"Agenda for Peace" Categories:

1. Preventive Diplomacy
2. Peacemaking
3. Peacekeeping
4. Peace Enforcement
5. Peace Building
6. Humanitarian Response

Maritime Roles & Capabilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	Remarks/Examples
DIPLOMATIC							
Actions in direct support of diplomatic efforts.							
Deployment/Presence/Deterrence	X	X	X	X	X	X	Contributing to crisis management or maintenance of stability. The act of deployment in itself sends diplomatic signals. Presence can be as overt or discrete as circumstances demand. Flexibility, self sustainment & mobility mean the ability to shift roles quickly. e.g. HMCS <i>Terra Nova</i> and <i>Kootenay</i> , Vietnam 1973
Negotiation	X	X	X				Warships can provide a secure neutral venue. e.g. - HMS <i>Avenger</i> , Dubrovnik 1992 - HMNZS <i>Endeavour</i> , Bougainville 1990 - French & US ships, Palestine, 1948 - USS <i>Rennville</i> , Dutch E. Indies 1947

Maritime Roles & Capabilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	Remarks/Examples
Confidence Building	X	X	X	X	X	X	Facilitating confidence through frequent contact, transparency & predictability. Maritime Confidence-Building Measures can set useful precedent because they are generally less controversial than those on land. e.g. Canadian facilitation of maritime CBMs within the Middle East Peace Process.
Verification	X	X	X	X	X	X	Verification of sea mine stocks, state of readiness of combatant vessels, compliance with arms reduction agreements etc.
PATROL Non-forceful information gathering.							
Surveillance	X	X	X	X	X	X	Knowing what is going on afloat is a fundamental requirement in any coastal, riverine or archipelagic theatre and is part of all maritime operations.
Examination of Shipping			X	X	X		Searching for contraband weapons etc. may be required even in the absence of sanctions or embargo.
Monitoring/Observing	X		X	X	X	X	Monitoring activities on scattered islands, oil rigs, along coasts with poor or non-existent roads, or where rivers are the highways. e.g. - Italian Navy, Gulf of Aqaba (MFO Sina), - Argentine Navy and multinational observers in Central America (ONUCA), - multinational contingent in Cambodia (UNTAC). - individuals provided to observer missions such as naval personnel in ECFMM (Balkans).

Maritime Roles & Capabilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	Remarks/Examples
CONTROL/PROTECTION	Active capabilities which may require force in defence of self or others.						
Interposition	X	X	X	X			Placing naval peacekeeping forces between belligerents. e.g. proposed but not implemented for the Formosa Strait in 1954/55.
Protection/Escort of Shipping	X	X	X	X	X	X	Protecting shipping (economic, humanitarian or logistic cargoes) against air, surface and subsurface threats, including piracy or terrorism. e.g. The "Tanker War" in the Persian/Arabian Gulf 1987/88.
Control of Shipping (Vessel traffic management or Naval Control of Shipping)			X	X	X		Scheduling and routing the peacekeeper's sealift, and/or vital commercial shipping, through mine or other danger areas or in congested waters. e.g. voluntary convoying during Armilla Patrol 1980-88
Security of Maritime Lines of Communication			X	X	X	X	Maintaining free and safe navigation of waterways and coastal shipping lanes. e.g. MFO Sinai
Harbour Control/Defence			X	X	X	X	Either to substitute for non-existent civil authority, or to provide additional security against rogue or criminal elements. e.g. - Port au Prince 1994 - UNTAC Port Authority Cambodia 1991-93

Maritime Roles & Capabilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	Remarks/Examples
Air Traffic Control/Air Defence			X	X	X	X	Controlling air traffic into coastal airports. Ships optimized for area air defence, stationed inshore can contribute to the air defence of the maritime flank of land forces. e.g. US Navy air control off Somalia 1992
Evacuation of civilian nationals	X	X	X	X	X	X	A contingency capability required in unstable circumstances. e.g. Canadian operations planned, but not executed for: - Jamaica 1979 - Haiti 1988 - Trinidad & Tobago 1990
ENFORCEMENT							
Interdiction/Embargo Enforcement	X	X	X	X			Active capabilities which may require offensive use of force to accomplish the mission. Enforcement of embargo/sanctions in support of peace efforts. e.g. the Canadian contributions to UN enforcement resolutions in: - Persian Gulf 1990 - Red Sea 1992 - Adriatic (FRY) 1993- - Caribbean (Haiti) 1993-94
Anti-smuggling operations			X	X	X	X	To maintain stability. Could range from counter-drug in support of fledgling civil authority, to prevention of illegal arms reaching terrorists

Maritime Roles & Capabilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	Remarks/Examples
Anti-piracy or anti-slavery operations	X	X	X	X	X	X	In support of fledgling civil authority and an obligation under international law.
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL REHABILITATION (Phrase taken from the 1995 Government Statement on foreign policy)							
Fisheries protection & assistance			X	X	X	X	Could be in support of fledgling civil authority, or required following a maritime conflict over fisheries such as the Anglo/Icelandic "Cod War" 1972 or the Canadian/EC disagreement in 1995. e.g. Cambodia 1992
Environmental protection			X	X	X	X	Observing, reporting and, if possible, response. May be beyond the capability of, or not an obvious priority for, a devastated local authority.
Search and Rescue (SAR)	X	X	X	X	X	X	Always a maritime role. e.g. Haitian refugees 1994
Hydrographic Support/Aids to Navigation			X		X	X	Restoration of aids to navigation e.g. Port au Prince 1994

Maritime Roles & Capabilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	Remarks/Examples
Mine Countermeasures (MCM)			X	X	X	X	A constant potential threat. e.g. Nicaragua 1984 Red Sea 1984 Dalmatia 1991/92
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)			X	X	X	X	Naval specialists may be best qualified to deal with threats to harbour facilities such as piers, warehouses & cranes.
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE							
Capabilities which contribute to relief of human suffering.							
Delivering humanitarian aid	X	X	X		X	X	e.g. Bangladesh 1991 HMCS <i>Preserver</i> , Somalia 1992 HMCS <i>Protecteur</i> , Florida & Bahamas 1992
Logistics			X		X	X	Naval logistics ships can serve as a depot ship alongside or anchored off ports which have minimal facilities e.g. HMCS <i>Preserver</i> , Somalia 1992
Medical/Dental			X		X	X	Ships with medical facilities can act as clinics alongside or anchored off ports with minimal facilities. e.g. HMCS <i>Preserver</i> , Somalia 1992

Maritime Roles & Capabilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	Remarks/Examples
Technical support			X		X	X	Although ideally a logistic ship capability, even combatant ships can provide water purification, power generation and technical expertise in an emergency. e.g. HMCS <i>Protecteur</i> , Florida & Bahamas 1992
MISSION SUPPORT TO JOINT PEACE OPERATIONS (Conceivably to associated NGOs as well as troops)							
Sealift				X	X	X	Naval sealift avoids potential delay while negotiating commercial contracts (e.g. delays in getting CC UNIMIH to Haiti 1995), gives an ability to go in harms way and flexibility for other employment such as replenishment e.g. HMCS <i>Bonaventure</i> , Cyprus 1964 USNS <i>General R.M. Blatchford</i> , Congo 1961 HMCS <i>Magnificent</i> , Suez 1956
Joint Force Headquarters			X	X	X	X	Interim or permanent afloat HQ if mobility is required or facilities inadequate ashore. e.g. HMCS <i>Preserver</i> , Somalia 1992 USS <i>Rennville</i> , Indonesia 1947 (planned for <i>Magnificent</i> in Suez)
Joint Force Logistics			X	X	X	X	As for "Humanitarian Response" e.g. HMCS <i>Preserver</i> in Somalia
Medical/Dental			X	X	X	X	As for "Humanitarian Response"

Maritime Roles & Capabilities	1	2	3	4	5	6	Remarks/Examples
Technical Support			X	X	X	X	As for "Humanitarian Response"
Redeployment/Withdrawal			X	X	X	X	An essential element in the planning of any mission which puts peacekeepers on the ground. e.g. USS <i>Palau</i> , Palestine 1948

MARITIME SECURITY WORKING PAPERS

No. 3
May 1996



NAVAL OFFICERS'
ASSOCIATION OF
CANADA



DALHOUSIE
UNIVERSITY



MARITIME DEFENCE
ASSOCIATION OF
CANADA

Published for the sponsors as a public service by
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies
Dalhousie University
Halifax, Nova Scotia
Canada B3H 4H6

Table of Contents

Preface	iii
Dr. Timothy S. Shaw	
Suggested Themes and Topics	v
Editorial Foreword	vii
F.W. Crickard	
Table of Contents	ix
The Future of Maritime Peacekeeping	1
Rear-Admiral G.L. Garnett	
The Influence of Seapower upon Peacekeeping: An Analytical Approach	15
Lieutenant-Commander D. Griffiths	
Multi-National Operations: Their Demands and Impact on Medium Power Navies	39
Commander Peter Jones, RAN	
Foreign Policy and Naval Forces: A Canadian Perspective	67
Lieutenant (N) B. Fenton	
Book Review	81